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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                      
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. ("Beneficial") appeals 
from an order dismissing its third-party claim against the 
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and remanding the remainder of 
this case to state court.  The district court reasoned that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded Beneficial's claim 
against the IRS.  At issue is whether the waiver of the sovereign 
immunity of the United States set forth either in the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 ("RFPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, 
or the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 
2671-2680, permits Beneficial's claim.  We hold that neither of 
these statutes waives the federal government's sovereign immunity 
against Beneficial's claim.  We will affirm in part and dismiss 




 This case arises out of a March 1991 installment loan 
agreement between Beneficial and defendants David Poltonowicz and 
John Poltonowicz ("the Poltonowiczs").  Beneficial, claiming that 
the Poltonowiczs defaulted on that loan, filed suit against them 
in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.  In response, the 
Poltonowiczs asserted a counterclaim, alleging that Beneficial 
had violated the terms of the loan agreement, as well as 
unspecified state and federal laws, by providing certain 
confidential information to third parties. 
 Beneficial admits that it released information 
concerning the Poltonowiczs to a third party, the IRS.  It 
nevertheless argues that this alleged breach of confidentiality 
was entirely justified.  It explains that IRS officials requested 
the confidential information in writing and certified to 
Beneficial, pursuant to the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b), 
that the request met the requirements of the RFPA.  The IRS also 
informed Beneficial that good-faith reliance upon the RFPA 
certification would relieve Beneficial of any possible liability 
to the Poltonowiczs for disclosing the requested account 
information.  See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(c). 
 This appeal arises because Beneficial did something 
more than assert the IRS's RFPA certification as a defense under 
§ 3417(c); it joined the IRS, alleging that, if Beneficial were 
held liable to the Poltonowiczs, it was entitled to judgment 
against the IRS for any amount they recovered.  In response, the 
IRS removed the case to the district court and filed a motion to 
  
dismiss on the ground that Beneficial's claim was barred by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  The district court granted the 
IRS's motion, dismissing Beneficial's claim against the IRS with 
prejudice, and remanding the case to state court.  Beneficial 
filed a timely motion for reconsideration.  The district court 
denied that motion and this appeal followed.   
 
  II. 
 We are presented with threshold issues of jurisdiction.  
With certain exceptions not here relevant, we may review only 
final orders of a district court.  Moreover, we are specifically 
barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) from reviewing "[a]n order 
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed," 
where the district court has decided to remand because it 
believes it "lacks subject matter jurisdiction."  28 U.S.C.  
§§ 1447(c), (d), as interpreted in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. 
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), and Gravitt v. Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co., 430 U.S. 723 (1977). 
 The November 30, 1993, order from which Beneficial 
appeals dismissed with prejudice its cross-claim against the IRS 
on "grounds of sovereign immunity" and remanded the remaining 
claims in the case to the state court from which it came because 
it had "no independent jurisdiction" over those claims.  
Beneficial asks us to hold that the district court erred in 
dismissing its claim against the IRS.  It further asks us to rule 
that the district court erred in remanding the other claims in 
  
the case whether or not it was justified in dismissing the IRS.1  
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review that portion of 
the November 30, 1993, order which dismissed Beneficial's claim 
against the IRS with prejudice, and we will affirm that part of 
the order.  We are without jurisdiction, however, to review the 
district court's remand decision.   
 Because the district court's decision to dismiss 
Beneficial's claim against the IRS affected the substantive 
rights of the parties and was separable from the district court's 
decision to remand, that portion of the order appealed from is a 
final one over which we have appellate jurisdiction despite the 
bar of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  This is the teaching of the Supreme 
Court's decision in City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143-44 (1934) (review permitted of an 
order dismissing one party to a case where that order was 
accompanied by a motion to remand because "in logic and fact the 
decree of dismissal preceded that of remand and was made by the 
District Court while it had control of the case."), and our 
decision in Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 674-78 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (same).   
 On the other hand, § 1447(d) bars our review of that 
portion of the district court's order remanding this case to 
state court.  City of Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guarantee 
                     
1
.  Beneficial contends that even if the IRS is protected by 
sovereign immunity, the district court had jurisdiction to rule, 
and should have ruled, on its motion for summary judgment on the 
Poltonowiczs' claim against Beneficial under the RFPA. 
  
Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143 (1934) (stating that "no appeal lies from 
the order of remand"); see generally 15A Charles A. Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.11, at 712-15 (1992 & 
Supp. 1994).  Cases permitting appellate consideration of remand 
orders, such as Carr or Thermtron Products, are inapposite.  We 
permitted review of the remand order in Carr because without that 
review, our decision overturning the district court's order which 
triggered the remand would have been meaningless.  17 F.3d at 
683.  Our decision here, in contrast, affirms the order preceding 
remand.  Thermtron Products is likewise inapplicable; the Supreme 
Court there permitted mandamus review of a remand order which was 
based "on grounds that [the district court] had no authority to 
consider."  423 U.S. at 351.  Here the district court's remand 
was based on its conclusion that it had no subject matter 
jurisdiction over the remaining claims and, as Thermtron Products 
expressly recognized, this is the kind of order which comes 
within the scope of § 1447(d) and may not be reviewed. 
 
 III. 
 It is well settled that the United States enjoys 
sovereign immunity from suits and, accordingly, may be sued only 
if it has waived that immunity.  United States v. Idaho ex rel. 
Dep't of Water Resources, 113 S. Ct. 1893, 1896 (1993); United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1014 (1992); FMC 
Corp. v. Department of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 838-39 (3d Cir. 
1994); In re University Med. Ctr. (University Med. Ctr. v. 
Sullivan), 973 F.2d 1065, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992).  The IRS, as an 
  
agency of the United States, is thus shielded from private 
actions unless sovereign immunity has been waived.  United States 
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).   
 "[W]aivers of federal sovereign immunity must be 
'unequivocally expressed'" in the statutory text and "'[a]ny such 
waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United 
States.'"  Idaho, 113 S. Ct. at 1896 (citations omitted); 
Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992); 
Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014-15; Ardestani v. INS, 112  
S. Ct. 515, 520 (1991); University Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d at 1085. 
   Beneficial asserts that two federal statutes permit it 
to bring its third-party claim against the IRS:  the Federal 
Right to Privacy Act ("the FRPA") and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
("the FTCA").  We consider the applicability of these two 
statutes in turn. 
 
 IV. 
 The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 3401-3422, is designed "to protect the customers of financial 
institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their records while 
at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activity."  
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305.  The RFPA's civil enforcement 
mechanism, § 3417(a), reflects this goal of protecting the 
privacy interests of customers of financial institutions.  It 
states in pertinent part: 
  
 (a) Liability of agencies or departments of 
United States or financial institutions.   
 Any agency or department of the United States 
or financial institution obtaining or 
disclosing financial records or information 
contained therein in violation of this 
chapter is liable to the customer to whom 
such records relate in an amount equal to the 
sum of -- 
 (1) $ 100 without regard to the volume of 
records involved; 
 (2) any actual damages sustained by the 
customer as a result of the disclosure; 
 (3) such punitive damages as the court may 
allow, where the violation is found to have 
been willful or intentional; and  
 (4) in the case of any successful action to 
enforce liability under this section, the 
costs of the action together with reasonable 
attorney's fees as determined by the court.  
 Beneficial maintains that § 3417(a) waives the IRS's 
sovereign immunity, giving Beneficial a cause of action against 
the IRS.  We disagree.  Nothing in the RFPA permits a financial 
institution like Beneficial, which is not a "customer" within the 
meaning of that Act, to bring suit to enforce its customers' 
RFPA-protected rights.  Further, nothing in the RFPA permits a 
financial institution to shift to the government as a joint tort-
feasor -- through a suit for contribution, indemnification, or 
otherwise -- any part of its burden of paying civil penalties to 
a customer for violations of the RFPA.  Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that the text of the RFPA evidences no intent on the 
part of Congress to waive sovereign immunity with respect to 




 Section 3417(a) is specifically limited to actions 
instituted by the "customer" whose rights to financial privacy 
have been violated.  The term customer "means any person or 
authorized representative of that person who utilized or is 
utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom a 
financial institution is acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in 
relation to an account maintained in the person's name."  12 
U.S.C. § 3401(5).  Here, Beneficial is the financial 
institution,2 not the customer; no one claims that the IRS 
somehow violated Beneficial's right to financial privacy.  Thus, 
any § 3417(a) claim Beneficial could have against the IRS would 
derive from its allegation that the IRS violated the 
Poltonowiczs' rights to financial privacy.   
 Beneficial suggests that § 3417(a) gives Beneficial the 
right to stand in the Poltonowiczs' shoes and assert their rights 
to privacy on their behalf.  Beneficial points to no provision in 
the RFPA, however, indicating that financial institutions may 
hold the government liable for violations of their customers' 
rights to financial privacy.  Instead, the essence of 
Beneficial's argument is that fairness requires that such a cause 
of action and a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect thereto 
be implied by courts called upon to enforce the RFPA.  It claims 
                     
2
.  The RFPA defines "financial institution" broadly as "any 
office of a bank, savings bank, card issuer . . ., industrial 
loan company, trust company, savings association . . ., credit 
union, or consumer finance institution . . . ."  12 U.S.C. 
3401(1).  Beneficial does not contest that it is a financial 
institution for the purposes of the RFPA. 
  
that, unless this court implies such a cause of action and 
waiver, Beneficial might be held liable to the Poltonowiczs 
merely because it had complied in good faith with the IRS's 
request for allegedly confidential financial information.  
 Nothing in the statute or the legislative history 
supports Beneficial's claim to an implied cause of action against 
the government for financial institutions to vindicate the rights 
of their customers.  In fact, § 3417(d), which states that "[t]he 
remedies and sanctions described in this chapter shall be the 
only authorized judicial remedies and sanctions for violations of 
this chapter," appears to mandate the exact opposite conclusion.  
See also H.R. Rep. No. 1383, at 49 (stating that "[t]he 
definitions of 'financial records' and 'customers,' taken 
together, are intended to preclude application of the bill to 
anyone other than the person to whose account information the 
government seeks to access").  Furthermore, Beneficial's fear of 
being held liable for its good-faith reliance on the IRS's RFPA 
certification is entirely unfounded.  Section 3417(c) 
specifically provides relief for a financial institution caught 
in a situation like the one Beneficial alleges, dictating that 
the institution may not be held liable to customers under the 
RFPA if it relied in good faith on a government authority's 
certified request for information.3  The availability of this 
                     
3
.  Section 3417(c) states: 
 
 Any financial institution or agent or 
employee thereof making a disclosure of 
financial records pursuant to this chapter in 
good-faith reliance upon a certificate by any 
  
defense obviates any need financial institutions might have to 
bring RFPA claims against the government for the government's 
violations of their customers' rights to financial privacy.  We 
therefore decline Beneficial's invitation to imply a derivative 
right on its behalf and to find an unexpressed waiver of 
sovereign immunity with respect to claims based on that right. 
 
 B. 
 Our conclusion must be the same with respect to 
Beneficial's effort to secure contribution or indemnity from the 
IRS under the RFPA as a joint tort-feasor.  Nothing in the RFPA 
creates a cause of action for contribution or indemnification in 
favor of a financial institution which has been held liable to a 
customer as a result of a disclosure to the government.  
Moreover, even if we were disposed to imply a cause of action for 
contribution or indemnification under the RFPA, we could not 
imply a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to that cause 
of action without running afoul of the well-established 
injunction against recognizing a waiver of federal sovereign 
(..continued) 
Government authority or pursuant to the 
provisions of section 3413(l) of this title 
shall not be liable to the customer for such 
disclosure under this chapter, the 
constitution of any State, or any law or 
regulation of any State or any political 
subdivision of any State.  
(Emphasis added.)   
  
immunity not evidenced in the statutory text.  See, e.g., Idaho, 
113 S. Ct. at 1896. 
 
 V. 
 As Beneficial points out, the Federal Tort Claims Act 
waives sovereign immunity as to claims against the United States 
for money damages for injury caused by the negligent or wrongful 
act or omission of a government employee acting within the scope 
of his employment "under circumstances where the United States, 
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in 
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission 
occurred."  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674.  
Beneficial insists that this waiver encompasses the following 
cross-claim it seeks to assert against the IRS: 
 In this matter, if [the Poltonowiczs'] 
allegations are proven correct, officers 
and/or agents of the IRS specifically misled 
Beneficial employees into believing that they 
were at all times entitled to and under a 
duty to respond as requested in the IRS' 
Request for Documents.  These requests were 
made by supposedly seasoned IRS agents, who 
knew or should have known of the requirements 
of the Federal Right to Financial Privacy 
Act.  Beneficial presented these allegations 
in its complaint to join the IRS as [an] 
additional defendant.  Should the allegation 
be proven correct, this conduct would rise to 
the level of tortious conduct under state 
law; the Government expressly waives 
sovereign immunity for such conduct by virtue 
of the Federal Tort Claims Act Title 28,  
 §§ 1346 and 2674. 
(Appellant's Br. at 21.)   
  
 This is the claim, and the only claim, Beneficial asks 
us to hold is within the scope of the sovereign immunity waiver 
found in the FTCA.  The district court concluded that the claim 
is not within the scope of that waiver because it "sounds in 
misrepresentation or deceit" and § 2680(h) of the FTCA 
specifically preserves the sovereign immunity of the United 
States with respect to claims "arising out of . . . 
misrepresentation [or] deceit."  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).  We agree 
with the district court. 
 Beneficial contends that its claim is a fraud claim 
under Pennsylvania law and that such claims differ from the 
claims of "misrepresentation" or "deceit" barred by § 2680(h).  
In its words, "the actions of the IRS representatives in this 
matter were on a much greater scale than mere misrepresentations 
and rose to the level of fraud.  Fraud or fraudulent 
misrepresentation is not excluded by the Federal Tort Claims 
Act."  (Appellant's Br. at 22.)  Beneficial's view of the law is 
mistaken.   
   The essence of an action for misrepresentation or 
deceit, for the purposes of § 2680(h), is a communication of 
misinformation upon which the recipient relies.  Block v. Neal, 
460 U.S. 289, 296-97 (1983); United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 
696, 702-11 (1961).  As a result, courts have consistently held 
that fraud claims against the government are not permitted under 
the FTCA.  See, e.g., United States v. Texarkana Trawlers, 846 
F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988); see 
also McNeily v. United States, 6 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 1993) 
  
(referring to § 2680(h) as the "fraud and misrepresentation" 
exception to the FTCA).4 
 Beneficial's fraud claim alleges that it relied to its 
detriment on the IRS's alleged misrepresentation that the IRS was 
entitled to the information it requested and that the IRS's 
certificate relieved Beneficial of any possible liability to the 
Poltonowiczs in connection with the disclosure of the account 
information.  This claim fits squarely into § 2680(h)'s 
misrepresentation and deceit exception to the FTCA's waiver of 
sovereign immunity.  It accordingly is barred by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.   
 Beneficial at times characterizes the above-quoted 
claim not only as a fraud claim but also as a claim for 
contribution or indemnification.  The FTCA's waiver of sovereign 
immunity normally encompasses claims for contribution or 
indemnification where the law of the relevant state would hold a 
private individual liable for contribution or indemnification in 
the same circumstances.  See, e.g., Lockheed Aircraft Co. v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 190, 196-98 (1983); United States v. 
Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 546-52 (1951).5  Claims for 
                     
4
.  Beneficial's argument that under Pennsylvania law a fraud 
claim is different from a claim for misrepresentation or deceit 
misses the mark.  The relevant issue is whether the claim 
Beneficial here presses is a claim based on "misrepresentation" 
and "deceit" as those terms are used in § 2680(h), and the scope 
of the § 2680(h) misrepresentation or deceit exception is defined 
by federal, not state, law.  Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc. v. 
United States, 705 F.2d 682, 683 (3d Cir. 1983). 
5
.  The FTCA waives sovereign immunity only in circumstances in 
which the United States would be liable under the law of the 
place where the government employee's act or omission occurred.  
  
contribution or indemnity against the government are prohibited, 
however, when permitting the claims to go forward effectively 
would defeat the purposes of a particular exception to the 
government's waiver of sovereign immunity.  See Stencel Aero 
Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977) 
(private party liable in tort to a military serviceman could not 
recover from federal government under a contribution or 
indemnification theory because permitting the claim would defeat 
the purposes behind the government's immunity against the 
serviceman's direct claim). 
 However Beneficial may characterize the only claim it 
here asserts against the IRS, the facts that give rise to 
liability under that claim involve misrepresentations or deceit 
(..continued) 
Accordingly, a showing of a violation of federal law will not 
alone suffice to qualify a claim under the FTCA's waiver.  
Nuclear Transp. & Storage, Inc. v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 
1351-53 (6th Cir. 1989) (no FTCA waiver with respect to Fifth 
Amendment claim), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1079 (1990); U.S. Gold & 
Silver Invs. Inc. v. United States, 885 F.2d 621, 621-22 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (same as to Lanham Act claim); Attallah v. United 
States, 955 F.2d 776, 785 n.15 (1st Cir. 1992) (same as to claims 
based on Customs regulations); Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United 
States, 967 F.2d 965, 969 (4th Cir. 1992) (same as to Hague 
Convention), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992); Boda v. United 
States, 698 F.2d 1174, 1176 (11th Cir. 1983) (same as to Due 
Process claim).  Beneficial refers us to no state law other than 
Pennsylvania case law pertaining to fraud.  Under the 
Pennsylvania law of contribution and indemnity, as we understand 
it, Beneficial could recover against the IRS under either theory 
only if the IRS were directly liable to the Poltonowiczs for the 
injuries they allegedly suffered.  We have found no Pennsylvania 
law which would impose liability on a private individual who did 
no more than request information from a financial institution and 
receive it when the request was voluntarily honored by the 
institution.  For this reason, we assume that Beneficial's 
decision to rest its FTCA argument solely on the facts alleged in 
support of its fraud claim was a deliberate one.   
  
and reliance by Beneficial to its detriment.  Permitting 
Beneficial to proceed with its "indemnification" and 
"contribution" claims effectively would defeat the purposes of 
the § 2680(h) misrepresentation and deceit exception to the 
government's waiver of sovereign immunity.  Cf. Stencel, 431 U.S. 
at 672-74; see also Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. American 
Bankshares Corp., 439 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (E.D. Wis. 1977) 
(holding that § 2680(h) bars a third-party misrepresentation 
claim against a government agency); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, 
Inc., 306 F. Supp. 855, 857-60 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (same).  We may 
not permit that result. 
 
 VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly 
dismissed Beneficial's third-party claim against the Internal 
Revenue Service for want of jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the 
portion of its order effectuating that decision will be affirmed. 
The remainder of the appeal will be dismissed for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction. 
 
